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Spatialreciprocityisawellknowntourdeforceofcooperationpromotion.Athoroughunderstandingofthe
effects of different population densities is therefore crucial. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in
socialdilemmasondifferentinteractiongraphswithacertainfractionofvacantnodes.Wefindthatsparsity
may favor the resolution of social dilemmas, especially if the population density is close to the percolation
threshold of the underlying graph. Regardless of the type of the governing social dilemma as well as
particularitiesoftheinteractiongraph,weshowthatunderpairwiseimitationthepercolationthresholdisa
universal indicator of how dense the occupancy ought to be for cooperation to be optimally promoted. We
also demonstrate that myopic updating, due to the lack of efficient spread of information via imitation,
renders the reported mechanism dysfunctional, which in turn further strengthens its foundations.
S
ince the seminal paper on games and spatial chaos
1, spatial reciprocity has been built upon as a powerful
mechanism for the promotion of cooperation
2. Alongside kin and group selection
3,4 as well as direct and
indirectreciprocity
5–9,itcompletesthelistofthebigfive
10heldresponsibleforwhywetendtoovercomeour
selfishness for the greater common good. Aiding its popularity is certainly the fact that its workings can be
describedinacoupleoflines.Iftheinteractionsamongstplayersarerestrictedtoonlyafewindividualsbymeans
of a graph, then cooperators can survive by means of forming compact clusters, which minimizes the potential
exploitationbydefectorsandprotectsthosethatarelocatedintheinteriorofsuchclustersagainstaninvasion.Itis
alongthelinesofthisobservationthatstudiesontheevolutionofcooperationhavereceivedasubstantialboost,as
evidenced in several reviews that capture succinctly recent advances on this topic
11–14.
One of the most notable spinoff discoveries stemming from the early works on the importance of spatial
structure
12,15–17 has been that complex networks, having the connectivity structure similar to that of social net-
works, are very beneficial for the evolution of cooperation
18–33. More generally, it was discovered that the
heterogeneity or diversity allows for cooperative behavior to prevail even if the temptations to defect are
large
34–38. Recently, evolutionary games have also been studied in growing populations
39,40 and hierarchical
structures
41, thus elegantly continuing this line of research.
Another important avenue of research having its roots firmly in spatial games is the study of disordered
environments
42, which subsequently gave rise to studies clarifying the role of mobility in different evolutionary
settings
43–48. It is by now a fact that mobility of players can pave the way towards a successful evolution of
cooperation, even if the conditions are noisy and do not necessarily favor the spreading of cooperators. Apart
fromanearlyworkondilutedlattices
42,however,theprimaryimpactofpopulationdensityhasnotbeenexplored.
Given that the early experiments on the behavior of rats under crowded conditions revealed that too high
population densities may induce a variety of destructive conditions, ranging from infant cannibalism over
excessive aggression to increased mortality at all ages
49, and that it was later confirmed that similar effects of
overcrowding can be observed not just by rodents, but also by primates
50 and humans
51, we are therefore
motivated to examine in detail the role of the population density by the resolution of social dilemmas. For this
purpose, we study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma, the snowdrift game and the stag-hunt
game on different lattices. All the simulation details are described in the Methods, while here we proceed with
presenting the results.
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Asmotivational results presented in Fig. 1(a) demonstrate, the usage
of ‘‘choosing the best’’ strategy updating rule, during which a player
follows unconditionally the strategy of its neighbor that has the
largest payoff, has a detrimental impact on the outcome of social
dilemmasondilutedlattices.Duetoitsdeterministicnature,strategy
updatingbychoosingthebestplayerintheneighborhoodfrequently
leads to the system being trapped into a frozen state, which however,
does not correspond to its global optimum. Moreover, the final state
depends sensitively on the initial configuration
42,52, especially at
lower densities of players (low values of r). To avoid unwanted
propertiesofdeterministic strategyupdating, weemployastochastic
updating rule with a direct noise parameter that allows ‘‘irrational’’
behavior, albeit with a small probability. This leads to qualitatively
different results that become independent of the initial state if r
exceeds0.2.AsFig.1(b)highlights,thereareintermediatepopulation
densities that play a more prominent and consistent role. Motivated
by these results, we proceed with using the pairwise stochastic imita-
tion w(sx R sy) (see Eq. 1) introduced in the Methods. Our goal is to
explore how the cooperation level depends on r, and how robust the
outcomes are if using different host latices. As described in the
Methods, a direct comparison is possible by means of normalizing
K (the uncertainty by strategy adoptions) with k (the degree that
characterizes different lattices).
Sinceitrepresentsthehardestsocialdilemmatosolve,westaywith
the focus on the prisoner’s dilemma game, and present in Fig. 2 its
outcome on four different lattices in dependence on the population
density r. It can be observed that there always exists an intermediate
value of r at which the fraction of cooperators fC is maximal.
Depending on the temptation to defect b and the type of the inter-
actiongraph,however,themaximaoffCoccuratdifferentr.Acloser
inspection reveals that in fact the shifts are strongly related to the
percolation thresholds
53 of the underlying lattices. Accordingly, in
panel (b) the maxima occur at the highest values of r, as the hon-
eycomb lattice indeed has the highest percolation threshold (p 5
0.6527) amongst the four considered lattices. Conversely, the cubic
lattice [see panel (d)], having p 5 0.2488, requires the lowest density
(largest sparsity) of players for the evolution of cooperation to be
optimally promoted.
Apart from the graph-specific dependence of the optimal r, there
are also general features common to all four interactions graphs. In
the r R 0 limit the majority of players will have no neighbors, and
hence fC simply mirrors back the initial state that is r 5 0.5. As r
increases, the few existing links between players enable defectors to
exploit cooperators without having to fear the consequences of spa-
tial reciprocity. Note that for sufficiently small r many players, as
well as large portions of the graph as a whole, will still be discon-
nected, hence prohibiting cooperators to form compact clusters and
utilizing spatial reciprocity to protect themselves against invading
defectors. Because of the random initial state, the initial invasion of
defectors will always be successful, regardless of the value of b. But
further invasions are subsequently hindered by the lack of connec-
tionsbetweenplayersthatareutilizingdifferentstrategies,andhence
at low values of r the decay of fC is universal for all values of b. For
larger r, however, the outcome becomes independent of the initial
state and the temptation to defect more and more crucial. For higher
values of b the fC trend simply continues downward as r increases,
which indicates that new cooperative players simply serve as ‘‘sitting
ducks’’ for defectors. At lower values of b cooperators are able to
utilizetheenhancedinterconnectednessbetweenthemtoformcom-
pactclusters,whileatthesametimebenefitingfromthedilutionthat
prohibits defectors to exploit them with the same efficiency as on a
fully populated graph. Accordingly, fC peaks at an intermediate
(optimal)valueofr,whichisabithigherbutclosetothepercolation
thresholdoftheunderlyinginteractiongraph
53.Thefactthatitisabit
higher is simply a consequence of the fact that not all players will be
cooperators, and hence for cooperation to start percolating the frac-
tion needs to be somewhat higher to offset the defectors.
Results presented in Fig. 3 for the snowdrift [panel (a)] and the
stag-hunt game [panel (b)] further add to the general validity of the
outlined mechanism. The percolation threshold still marks the
advent of enhanced cooperation, although for the stag-hunt game
[panel (b)], which is in itself more lenient for the evolution of coop-
eration, the all-C state rather than an optimum in fC sets in. Along
with the results reported previously for the multi-player interaction
publicgoodsgame
54,thisleadsustotheconclusionthatapopulation
densityclosetothepercolationthresholdisoptimalforthesuccessful
evolution of cooperation. In particular, the players are connected
enough to transfer the more advantageous mutually beneficial coop-
erativestrategy,whilesimultaneouslythegraphisdilutedenoughfor
the defectors to be unable to invade cooperators effectively. Crucial
forthisscenariotobevalidisthuspercolation,anddirectlyrelatedto
that the fact that information can spread efficiently by means of
stochastic strategy imitation.
The validity of this argument can be tested effectively by replacing
the strategy updating via imitation by the so-called myopic strategy
updatingrule
55,56.Inthiscase,everyplayermakesdecisionslocallyas
an individual, always assuming an unchanged neighborhood (see
Figure 1 | Fraction of cooperators fC in dependence on the population density r for different values of the temptation to defect b (see legend), as
obtained for the prisoner’s dilemma game on the square lattice under sequential updating. Results in panel (a) were obtained with the ‘‘choosing the
best’’strategy updatingrulefollowing
42,whileresultsinpanel(b)wereobtainedbymeansofastochasticversionofthesame rule.Ifplayers arenolonger
forcedtostrictlyadoptthestrategyoftheirbestneighbor,thefC(r)dependencechangesdramatically,exhibitingaconsistentoptimumatanintermediate
value of r. This is because frozen states that do not correspond to the global optimum, as well as the sensitivity on initial conditions, especially at low r
values,areavoided.Introducingsomeuncertaintytostrategyadoptions[panel(b)]thushelpstorevealamoreinterestingimpactofpopulationdensityas
was previously reported to exist.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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the existence or absence of the percolation of players becomes an
uncritical property of the interaction topology, and hence it is
expected that the outlined mechanism will no longer work. Results
presented in Fig. 4 fully confirm this expectation, as indeed neither
for the prisoner’s dilemma [panel (a)] nor for the snowdrift game
[panel (b)] a decisive importance of an intermediate population
density cannot be observed. As the population density increases,
the fraction of cooperators decays more or less fast in the prisoner’s
dilemmagame,indicatingthatthenewconnectionsamongstplayers
mainly serve the defecting strategy by allowing an ever increasing
efficiency of local exploitation. The situation for the snowdrift game,
shown in Fig. 4(b), is a bit different because the myopic strategy
updating allows for the emergence of a role-separating distribution
of Cs and Ds independently on the value of r, which is reminiscent
of anti-ferromagnetic order
56. The increase in the level of coopera-
tion, however, is significantly lower than reported in Fig. 3(a) for
imitation.
Figure 3 | Fraction of cooperators fC in dependence on the population density r for different values of the cost-to-benefit ration r (see legend), as
obtained on the square lattice for the snowdrift [panel (a)] and the stag-hunt [(panel (b)] game by using strategy imitation defined by Eq. 1. For the
snowdriftgametheresultsarequalitativelyidenticalasfortheprisoner’sdilemmagameinthatthereexistsanintermediatevalueofrwherefCismaximal.
Since the stag-hung game is a less severe social dilemma, the exceeding of the percolation threshold is sufficient for eliciting the all-C state. Regardless of
the governing social dilemma, however, the percolation threshold is an important benchmark for how high a population density ought to be for
cooperation to thrive. Error bars are comparable to the size of symbols.
Figure 2 | Fraction of cooperators fC in dependence on the population density r for different values of the temptation to defect b (see legend), as
obtainedfortheprisoner’sdilemmagameonthesquarelattice[panel(a)],thehoneycomblattice[(panel(b)],thetriangularlattice[(panel(c)]andthe
cubiclattice[(panel(d)]. Itcanbeobservedthat,regardlessofthetypeoftheunderlyinginteractiongraph,therealwaysexistsandintermediatevalueofr
atwhichfCismaximal.Moreimportantly,ifbisclosetothecriticalvalueatwhichcooperatorswouldnormallydieout,theoptimalpopulationdensityis
stronglyrelatedtothepercolationthresholdoftheinteractiongraph.Forthesquarelatticethelatterisp50.5,forthehoneycomblatticeitisp50.6527,
for the triangular lattice it is p 5 0.3472, while for the cubic lattice it is p 5 0.2488. Accordingly, percolation plays a key role by the resolution of social
dilemmas by significantly elevating the effectiveness of spatial reciprocity. Error bars are comparable to the size of symbols.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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presented in Fig. 5 also agree with our expectations, only that in
this case r 5 0.5 constitutes a transition point, above (below)
which a pure D (C) phase evolves. Accordingly, increasing r
towards one simply drives the system towards the expected state.
The percolation threshold plays not role at all. Exactly at r 5 0.5,
however, both the pure C and the pure D phase are equally
probable. At low population densities (left and middle snapshot)
both phases can coexist isolated from one another, hence yielding
fC 5 0.5, while at sufficiently high populations densities (right
snapshot) a pure phase will eventually be reached (not shown) but
since both outcomes are equally probable fC is again 0.5.
Regardless of the studied social dilemma, and also regardless of
the type of the interaction graph, myopic updating cannot sup-
port an efficient transfer of information between the players, and
thus renders the reaching of the percolation threshold with the
Figure 4 | Fraction of cooperators fC in dependence on the population density r, as obtained on the square lattice under myopic updating (see Eq. 2),
fortheprisoner’sdilemma[panel(a)]andthesnowdriftgame[panel(b)].Regardlessofthegoverningtemptationtodefectb,intheprisoner’sdilemma
game the population density has a monotonous impact on fC. In the snowdrift game, however, the myopic updating can lead to a role-separating
distribution of Cs and Ds that is reminiscent of anti-ferromagnetic order. Yet the increase of cooperation stemming from this is practically negligible,
especially if compared to the results presented in Fig. 3(a), where imitation was used as the driving force behind the evolution of strategies. These
observationsconfirmthatthemechanismbymeansofwhichthepercolationthresholdisestablishedastheoptimalpopulationdensityfortheresolution
ofsocialdilemmasreliesonthepercolationofcooperatorsandthedirectlyrelatedeffectivespreadofinformationviastrategyimitation.Myopicupdating
hinders the later, and hence the mechanism becomes dysfunctional. Error bars are comparable to the size of symbols.
Figure 5 | Fraction of cooperators fC in dependence on the population density r, as obtained on the square lattice under myopic updating (see Eq. 2),
for the stag-hunt game. As reported for the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game in Fig. 4, here too the population density has a monotonous
impact,which howeverdepends on the value ofthe cost-to-benefit ratior.I fr ,0.5 the finaldestination isthe all-Cphase, andaccordingly, increasing r
leadsprogressivelytowardsthissolution.Conversely,forr.0.5thefinaloutcomeonthefullypopulatedlatticeistheall-Dphase,andthusasrincreases
fCdecays. At r 50.5,however, thereis atransition from the pure Ctothe pure D phase,and infact onafully populated lattice both are equally probable,
hencefC50.5.Forlowvaluesofr,however,themanifestationoffC50.5isnotbymeansofaneventualevolutionofeitherapureCorapureDphase,but
rather by the simultaneous yet isolated coexistence of both phases, as demonstrated by the characteristic snapshots in the bottom row left (r 5 0.2) and
middle(r50.5).Ifrissufficientlylarge,however,theoriginalsolutionisrecovered.Therightsnapshotwasobtainedatr50.8anddemonstratessucha
scenario,butthestationarystate(whichwillbeeither apureCorapureDphase)isnot yetreached.Inthesnapshots (bottomrow)whitedenotesvacant
sites, while green and red are cooperators and defectors, respectively.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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our arguments and establishes the percolation threshold as the
key property of a graph that determine the optimal population
density.
Discussion
Previous studies highlighted that imitation plays a decisive role by
the evolution of strategies amongst humans. By building on this fact,
we have shown that the percolation threshold of the matrix that
determines the interactions between players constitutes the optimal
population density for the resolution of social dilemmas that are
governedbypairwiseinteractions.Forthemechanismtowork,some
level of uncertainty by strategy adoptions is crucial as it prevents the
systembeingtrappedintoafrozenstate,anditalleviatesthedepend-
enceoninitialconditions,especiallyifthepopulationdensityishigh.
Wehavedemonstratedthattheresultsarevalidforallsocialdilemma
games and on a wide class of different lattices, which together with
the previous results on the public goods game that is governed by
groupinteractions
54,firmlysolidifiesthepercolationthresholdasthe
crucial property that determines the optimal population density for
the evolution of cooperation. As a reverse test, we have verified the
validity of our arguments by means of the myopic updating rule,
under which players are no longer able to exchange information
directly between each other. Expectedly, we have found that the
percolationthresholdnolongerhasadecisiveimpactontheoutcome
of the three considered social dilemmas. This confirms that the per-
colation threshold constitutes the optimal population density for the
resolution of social dilemmas by ensuring the percolation of coop-
erators and the directly related effective spread of information via
strategy imitation.
It can be argued that the optimal population density amplifies the
mechanism of spatial reciprocity
1. If the population density is too
low, vacant sites prohibit the formation of compact clusters by cut-
ting short the communication paths between the cooperators. Too
high populations densities, on the other hand, enable an effective
invasion of defectors, which again disrupts reciprocity amongst
cooperators by splitting them up into isolated clusters. Presented
results thus allow us to understand the impact of population density
on the resolution of social dilemmas through the concept of percola-
tion, and by doing so they provide an interesting interdisciplinary
link between statistical physics and the evolution of cooperation.
Methods
Within this work we consider the spatial prisoner’s dilemma, the spatial snowdrift
and the spatial stag-hunt game. In all three games players can choose either to
cooperate (sx 5 C 5 1) or to defect (sx 5 D 5 0), whereby mutual cooperation yields
therewardR,mutualdefectionleadstopunishmentP,andthemixedchoicegivesthe
cooperatorthesucker’s payoffSandthedefectorthetemptationT.Dependingonthe
rankofthesefourpayoffs wehavetheprisoner’s dilemmagameifT.R.P.S,the
snowdrift game if T . R . S . P, and the stag-hunt game if R . T . P . S. For
simplicity,weheretakeR51andP50,whichimposesboundariesontheremaining
two payoffs of the form –1 # S # 1 and 0 # T # 2. Further zooming in on the most
relevant features of the three dilemmas, we take for the prisoner’s dilemma the
temptation to defect T 5 b and the punishment for mutual defection P 5 0
1, for the
snowdriftgamewetakeT511randS51–r
57,whileforthestag-huntgameweuse
T 5 r and S 5 –r, where r in both cases is the cost-to-benefit ratio. As interaction
graphsthatcharacterizethetopologyofthematrixcontainingplayers,weemploythe
square,honeycomb,triangularandthecubiclattice,eachwithlinearsizeLandonlya
fraction r of occupied nodes. The remaining 1 – r nodes are left vacant. The random
dilution is performed only once at the start of the game.
Following the initialization, we carry out Monte Carlo simulations comprising the
following elementary steps. First, a randomly selected player x acquires its payoff px
by playing the game with its k neighbors, as specified by the underlying interaction
graph. Next, one randomly chosen neighbor, denoted by y, also acquires its payoff py
byplayingthegamewithitsfourneighbors.Lastly,playerxtriestoenforceitsstrategy
sx on player y in accordance with the probability
ws x?sy

~
1
1zexp py{px
 
kK ðÞ
 ð1Þ
where K determines the level of uncertainty by strategy adoptions
12, which can be
attributedtoerrorsinjudgmentduetomistakesandexternalinfluencesthataffectthe
evaluationoftheopponent.WithoutlossofgeneralitywesetK50.1normalizedwith
the degree of the underlying lattice k, implying that better performing players are
readily imitated, but it is not impossible to adopt the strategy of a player performing
worse. Each Monte Carlo step (MCS) gives a chance for every player to enforce its
strategy onto one of the neighbors (if they exist, which at sufficiently small r will not
be the case) once on average. The average density of cooperators fC 5 r
–1L
–2Sxsx is
determined in the stationary state after sufficiently long relaxation times. Depending
on the actual conditions the linear system size was varied from L 5 200 to 1200 and
the relaxation time was varied from 10
4 to 10
6 MCS to ensure proper accuracy. The
presented results are independent of the system size and valid in the large size limit.
As an alternative to imitation we also consider the myopic updating rule, where
insteadofcomparingpayoffswithaneighboringplayeranddeterminingw(sxRsy)as
theprobabilityofstrategytransfer(seeEq.1),a randomlychosenplayer xchanges its
strategy sx to the other strategy s0
x with a probability
qs 0
x?sx

~
1
1zexp px{p0
x
 
kK ðÞ
 ð2Þ
wherepxandp0
x arethepayoffsofplayerxwhenplayingsxands0
x initsneighborhood.
The simulation details and the determination of fC, however, are the same as by
imitation.
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